For privacy and security Internet Explorer (IE) wouldn’t be my recommended browser ever – but today I had to test a website connection which I was having trouble with through my tunneled Firefox.

To do this I had a look at this site and some of their tools: CentralOps.net

I found using the Domain Dossier with service scan and trace route clicked helped me no end.

While I was there, and using IE6, I had a quick look at their Browser Mirror, and noticed this under clipboard

As can be easily seen, I had the words “Browser Mirror” in my clipboard and this script could read it – not so secure.

To fix this I change the security preferences from “default level” to Custom Level and disabled all automatic scripting functions, like so:

From (insecure):

To (more? secure):

For security and privacy reasons it is best simply not to use this junk – use Firefox (I tested Firefox and nothing was taken from my clipboard).

Recently I have needed to socksify a mac.

Socksifying means that applications (like email pop3 / smtp programs) that normally do not use proxies or socks can tunnel their connections through the socks proxy. Socksifying connections is used mostly when using SSH secure tunneling for privacy and anonymous reasons (fully encrypted and secure all your internet / network connections including; web surfing, pop3 / smtp email, chat, etc use). The SSH tunnel service provider must be running socks4 or socks5 proxy software.

Now with a windows PC this is fairly straight forward (I thought) as there is free software available (called SocksCap). To socksify a PC connection means a simple download, install and configuration of the free software.

Being a ex-PC user (aren’t we all!) I thought the same would be required for my mac, how was I wrong, I wasted days downloading and installing many useless programs like fink, socat and what they required, Xcode (a 600 + mb download!).

After 2 days of total frustration I simply configured my network and browser proxy settings to the “socks” proxy only (left everything else blank) – and guess what it worked like a charm. No software to install, no configuration at all – macs are so easy sometimes the ease is simply overlooked.

To socksify your mac simply leave all other proxy settings empty and only fill in the socks proxy boxes.

In details it means;

1. Open up your system preferences, choose network, choose the live connection (most likely already selected), click configure, click proxy settings, and in the two socks boxes put in the socks server you are using and port. Click apply and you are finished.

A mac must be the easiest machine to sockify!

Why would anyone want to do this? Well … for privacy and anonymity on the internet of course …

Need Internet Explorer (IE) for testing websites or just to work with some websites (surely no one would actually want to use it) AND are running Debian or Ubuntu? Then this maybe for you, no visualization software to install, installation is not complicated at all!

Running Internet Explorer in Debian and ubuntu Linux

Is there anything Linux can not do? Of course at the moment there is but there is always a workaround – worse case is running a windows dual boot system or running windows actually on your Linux operating system (more about that later).

And MAC users thought they where safe!

Check out this list of active keyloggers, viruses, trojans, spyware, remote access baddies;

Trojan: ttyltty, TakeDown Suite, UnderHand Server, UnderHand Trojan Server, UnderHand, Termite X, Termite ServerEdit, Termite, Xover Server, Xover Client, HellRaiser Client 3.0 and HellRaiser Server 3.0

Keylogger: Monitorer, CarbonKeys Client 1.2, CarbonKeys Client 1.3, CarbonKeys Server 1.2, CarbonKeys Server 1.3, Monitorer Manager, Monitorer Pro Manager, OSXvnc, CarbonKeys, TextTrap, SuperSave, Peeping Tom, Mac Life Insurance, Invisible Oasis, Last Resort, KeyStroke, Keystroke Recorder, TypeSaver , TypeRecorder, Monitorer X, Keyboard Spy, Keyboard and Mouse Recorder, Keystroke Recorder X and Monitorer X Pro

Remote Administration: TypeRecorder X, WDTech RAE

Instant Access Dialer: PPP Dialer

Login Bypasser: BypassIt

Remote Access Trojan: Xover

A list of trojans, etc can be found here: http://macscan.securemac.com/list.php

I tried out MacScan and found nothing on my Mac (excellent to see of course) but that does make me wonder – since I have never used this type of scanner before *ever* just how many of these bad guys are actually running around and active (outside the real narsty side of the web of course).

Check out MacScan for yourself, free download and shareware for around a month and US$ 30 to buy.

Using the 1992 presidential election as his springboard, documentary filmmaker Brian Springer captures the behind-the-scenes maneuverings of politicians and newscasters in the early 1990s. Pat Robertson banters about “homos,” Al Gore learns how to avoid abortion questions, George Bush talks to Larry King about halcyon — all presuming they’re off camera. Composed of 100% unauthorized satellite footage, Spin is a surreal expose of media-constructed reality.

Spin by Brian Springer

Free and open source SSL secure certificates for your websites are available now from CACert.

Now, website owners can save hundreds (if not thousands) when securing their websites.

Sadly, CACert is having trouble getting their root certificate preinstalled in most common browsers – this system of course protects the established expensive providers only – not the end user (us).

CACert’s root certificate is very easy to install – one click install here (this page gives you the install option).

Main website: http://www.cacert.org/

How to spot a terrorist, taken from the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime Terrorism Awareness and Prevention site. This list basically covers most anyone who does anything – or believes anything – AT ALL!

Any involvement or belief from say organic vegetables to being a American Indian can lead you to be tagged a terrorist.

… the extreme fringe believes that the U.S. government is either the enemy or has been subverted by the enemy and must be actively defended against …

Who are Terrorists?

Domestic Terrorists

Anti-Government Groups

The history of our country is filled with opposition to a strong federal government. George Washington marched troops into Pennsylvania to enforce the federal government’s power to levy taxes. We fought a civil war over the question of the power of states vs. federal government.

The modern Anti-Government movement evolved in reaction to:

• gun control laws of the 1990s
• the federal government’s actions at Waco (Branch Davidians)
• the federal government’s actions at Ruby Ridge (Randy Weaver)

Often associated with unorganized militias, the Anti-Government movement actually embraces a much larger variety of groups and causes. The extreme fringe believes that the U.S. government is either the enemy or has been subverted by the enemy and must be actively defended against.

Anti-Government Issues and Beliefs

Gun Control is a conspiracy to enslave us starting with the removal of our ability to either defend ourselves or forcefully change our government.

The first ten amendments of The Constitution are God given and all others are temporary, invalid or outright fraudulent.

All judicial authority resides with the people. The jury, not the Judge, directs trials and can nullify laws they do not approve of.

U.S. sovereignty is being surrendered to the U.N., World Court, and World Bank, with the U.S. becoming an economic region of this New World Order.

Anti-Government activists often believe they have never accepted U.S. citizenship or can renounce it.

Federal and State governments do not have the legal authority to levy taxes or interfere with travel or private enterprise by requiring licenses or regulating activity or conduct.

Anarchists

• believe every organization or government will eventually be corrupted by power
• evolved from left wing or communist groups of the 60s and 70s
• focus on specific issues that represent corruption of power
• are often responsible for violent protests against:
- military intervention
- world trade and banking
- globalization
- “hate” groups

Separatists

There are separatist and nationalist movements all over the world. These are people wanting their own homeland. Some separatists are willing to commit crimes to secure this independence.

Separatist groups within the U.S. include:

• White Supremacists – want to establish a homeland using five states in the U.S. northwest

• Black Separatists/Nationalists – want reparations for past slave labor and have suggested a homeland made up of five southern states

• Puerto Rican Nationalists – demand an independent Puerto Rico

• American Indian Activists – push for a return of “stolen” lands and self-determination

• Neo-Confederates – want to again secede from the Union

• Movements in some states (i.e. Hawaii or Texas) claim that their states were never properly/legally brought into the union.

Single Issue Groups

Law enforcement often feels the greatest terrorist threat is from “single issue” or “special interest” groups. The members of these groups are dedicated to fixing a perceived wrong. They often have both mainstream support and a radical fringe.

Past crimes committed by extremist members of these groups include:

• Harassment
• Vandalism
• Arson
• Bombings
• Murder

Single Issue movements include:

• Environmentalists
• Animal Rights
• Pro-Life
• Anti-Nuclear/Anti-War
• Gay Rights
• Anti-Geneticists (opposed to genetically altered crops)

You have just completed the “Who are Terrorists?” section of your Terrorism Awareness and Prevention training.

Source

Protecting your main email address is becoming more and more important.

Phishing attacks (where a scammer send you a email which *looks like* it is from your bank or other trusted source) are dangerous, one slip up and you may find yourself in big trouble.

Other *lose email* practices simply result in your inbox just being filled with garbage – spam, spam and more spam! Use the internet long enough and you will start to receive hundreds of spam emails everyday.

There are a few options available to the average person to tackle spam and it’s dangers:

1. Never give anyone your email address (this is fairly pointless …).

2. Buy spam filter software. This firstly costs money and secondly can cause more headaches when you lose *real* emails to your spam filter – note this happens all the time.

3. Use disposable email addresses – now this is what I use and of course prefer.

Now from the above list option 1 is obviously out, option 2 is common and works for most people, even most free web based email services like fastmail.fm and safe-mail.net have good spam filtering features available) but option 3 is very secure and works like a sledge hammer.

Option 3 is where you use a disposable email address, for example;

1. You have your main email account (can be a web based account or the email account provided by your ISP).

2. You want to *register* on a website, so instead of putting in your main email account you put in a disposable email address instead.

Now, you still receive all the email into your main account as you normally would, but the big difference is, if that particular email ever is sold to spammers or stolen all you simply do is *turn it off*. Therefore no more spam from that address.

Disposable email addresses are perfect for anyone who has a website – the disposable address is published on the website and when to many of the spam robots have your email address simply turn it off and get a new one – replace the old one with your new one of your website.

Disposable email addresses are excellent for security, if you use a different email address for every website sign up or registration then you will know if you receive a *phishing attack* from a email address *your bank does not have* then it is a obvious scam.

I never use my main email address for any registrations on the internet unless I really have to, this includes banks and other financial services as well.

So where do you get a disposable email address? You can get as many as you like here: http://www.sneakemail.com/

And yes, you can also get a free account.

There are limitations with the free account but the limits are so big most people would never have to worry. Just keep in mind the limits and do not signup to a email list that receives thousands of emails a day. For using on websites you would be hard pressed to reach the *free account* limits.

Paid accounts are available of course, those accounts have absolutely huge limits, they are called *Premium* accounts and are only $2.00 a month.

Notes from their website:

1. Create an account: Providing a username, a password, and an email address you wish hidden from spammers.

2. Every time you need to give out your email address to somebody you don’t trust, log in to Sneakemail and create a new Sneakemail address.

3. Give this Sneakemail address to them instead.

Mail sent to this Sneakemail address is rerouted to your real address, and when you reply it is rerouted back to the sender. Your real address is never seen. If you receive unwanted mail through this Sneakemail address, such as spam, you can take control by either filtering incoming mail using the Sneakemail filters, disabling the Sneakemail address itself, or disposing of it permanently. You also now know where a spammer got your address.

Sick of spam? Stop the rot! Secure your inbox today with Sneakemail

Latest document from the court case against e-gold by the USA government. Noted points are baseless claims, forced seizure of gold and no right of reply (of the victims who have had their e-gold accounts frozen).

Charges include; Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments and operating a Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business.

Click the link below to read the details.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Holding a Criminal Term
Grand Jury Sworn in on May 11, 2006
: Criminal No.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
: GRAND JURY ORIGINAL
v. :
: VIOLATIONS:
E-GOLD, LTD. :
GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC. : 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Conspiracy
DOUGLAS L. JACKSON, : to Launder Monetary Instruments);
BARRY K. DOWNEY, and :
REID A. JACKSON, : 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy);
:
Defendants. : 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (Operation of Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business);
:
: D.C. Code § 26-1002 (Money Transmitting Without a License)
::
18 U.S.C. § 2 (Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to be Done); and 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (Criminal Forfeiture).

I N D I C T M E N T
The Grand Jury Charges:

INTRODUCTION
At all times material to this Indictment:

Digital Currency

1. A “digital currency” was a medium of exchange offered over the Internet that was purportedly backed by precious metals and offered users another option for conducting on-line funds transfers. Digital currencies were generally marketed as offering global acceptance without the need for conversion between national currencies, and were valued at fluctuating rates tied to the price of a particular precious metal, particularly gold. Digital currency was used for on-line commerce and for funds transfers between individuals for non-commercial purposes. While technically speaking, the owner of digital currency could have had some right to acquire the actual metal behind the currency, digital currency users typically converted their value into a national currency when they wanted to take value out of the on-line system.

2. One of the earliest issuers of digital currency was e-gold, Ltd. (E-GOLD), which operated via the Internet using the domain name www.e-gold.com, and began offering the digital currency “e-gold” in 1996. E-GOLD appeared as the most popular and prominent digital currency available on-line. E-GOLD was widely accepted as a payment mechanism for transactions involving credit card and identification fraud, high yield investment programs and other investment scams, and child exploitation. E-GOLD was not widely accepted by large or mainstream vendors.

3. There were four primary steps involved in a financial transaction using “e-gold”: (i) opening a digital currency account with E-GOLD; (ii) converting national currency into “egold” to fund the account; (iii) using “e-gold” to buy or sell a good or service or transfer funds to another person; and (iv) exchanging “e-gold” back into national currency. E-GOLD needed two additional parties to complete these steps: (i) digital currency exchangers; and (ii) merchants or individuals that accepted “e-gold” for the payment of goods and services or the transfer of funds.

4. Digital currency exchangers took national currency from customers and exchanged it into “e-gold” for purposes of funding a new E-GOLD account, or increasing the value of an existing account.

5. Exchangers also exchanged “e-gold” back into national currency and were typically the only method by which users could obtain the value out of an E-GOLD account, short of taking possession of the precious metal itself, which was not always possible and practically never done. Each exchanger set its own terms and conditions on the types and amounts of national currency that would be accepted for exchange. Some only accepted transfers from banks or credit card accounts. Others accepted cash and money orders. Many exchangers operated out of their home by using an Internet website to service customers, bank accounts for accepting cash and other deposits, and post office boxes for receipt of checks and other mailings.

6. Users around the world may register for a free E-GOLD account via the EGOLD website and fund their account through a third party digital currency exchanger or through E-GOLD’s own exchange service, which it called “OmniPay.” Once open and funded, account holders could access their accounts through the Internet and conduct transactions with other parties anywhere in the world. E-GOLD advertised on its website that it is “an alternative Internet payment system” that “empowers people to use gold as money.” E-GOLD advertised its service as “Better Money,” and “Internet Payments 100% backed by Gold.”

Money Transmitting Business Laws and Bank Secrecy Act Requirements

7. Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1960, it is a felony to conduct a money transmitting business without the appropriate state license (in a state that has a licensing requirement and punishes such operation as a misdemeanor or felony) or federal registration, or when it otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or intended to be used to promote unlawful activity. The majority of States and the District of Columbia require money transmitting businesses to obtain a license and comply with the other regulatory requirements that apply to such licensed entities, and punish the unlicensed operation of a money transmitting business as a misdemeanor or felony. Likewise, the federal government requires money transmitting businesses to have registered with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the Department of Treasury, by December 31, 2001 if they were in existence before that date, and, otherwise, within 180 days after the date the business was established.

8. The federal unlicensed money transmitting business statute, Title 18, United States Code, Section 1960, was enacted in 1992 in order “to combat the growing use of money transmitting businesses to transfer large amounts of the monetary proceeds of unlawful enterprises.”

9. The term “money transmitting” under Section 1960(b)(2) includes “transferring funds on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited to transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, facsimile, or courier.” The term “State,” under Section 1960(b)(3) includes the District of Columbia.

10. In addition to being subject to the state licensing and federal registration requirements, money transmitting businesses are subject to provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act. The Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations require, among other things, such businesses to take steps to avoid laundering the proceeds of crime and to report suspicious transactions to law enforcement authorities.

11. Pursuant to Title 31, United States Code, Section 5318(h), and the implementing regulations (31 C.F.R. § 103.125), effective July 24, 2002, money transmitting businesses must establish in writing an anti-money laundering program, minimally including:

(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls;

(B) the designation of a compliance officer;

(C) an ongoing employee training program; and

(D) an independent audit function to test programs.

Therefore, unlike an ordinary business, money transmitting businesses have an independent statutory and regulatory obligation to understand the nature and source of the funds they transmit, and to ensure systems are in place to detect and prevent transactions made with the proceeds of crime.

12. Pursuant to section 5318(g) of Title 31, United States Code, in conjunction with 31 C.F.R. § 103.20, money transmitting businesses are also required to file reports of suspicious transactions (so-called “Suspicious Activity Reports” or “SARs”) in circumstances set forth by statute and regulation, including where a transaction or pattern of transactions exceeding a specified amount is in possible violation of a law or regulation.

13. E-GOLD and its associated entities were in the business of transmitting funds on behalf of the public and were required to be licensed by the District of Columbia, the State of Florida, and other States, to be registered with the federal government, and to establish an anti- money laundering program.

Conspirators and their Roles

14. E-GOLD, LTD. (“E-GOLD”) was the issuer of the digital currency known as “e-gold,” which functioned as an alternative payment system, was purportedly backed by stored physical gold, and operated via the Internet using the domain name www.e-gold.com. E-GOLD was incorporated in the British West Indies island nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, but was operated out of Melbourne, Florida.

15. GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC. (“GSR”) was the operator of E-GOLD and its respective website, and offered a digital currency exchange service (known as OmniPay) for individuals wishing to purchase, transfer, and/or sell e-gold. OmniPay operated via the Internet using the domain name www.omnipay.com.

16. DOUGLAS L. JACKSON (“DOUGLAS JACKSON”) was the co-founder, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer of E-GOLD and GSR (collectively “the E-GOLD operation”). He also owned approximately fifty-five percent of GSR.

17. BARRY K. DOWNEY (“BARRY DOWNEY”) was the co-founder, Secretary, Vice-President, and Director of E-GOLD and GSR. He also owned approximately twenty percent of GSR.

18. REID A. JACKSON (“REID JACKSON”) was the Managing Director of EGOLD and GSR. He also owned approximately three percent of GSR.

The E-GOLD Operation

19. The E-GOLD operation claimed publicly that it was not subject to the statutes and regulations of the United States nor of any other country in which they operated or offered their services, unlike legitimate financial institutions.

20. A valid email address was the only information required to open an E-GOLD account. Although other contact information was requested, this information was not verified. E-GOLD advertised on its website that there are no barriers to entry, that it costs nothing to open an E-GOLD account, that there is no credit check, and that there is no minimum balance requirement.

21. During the regular course of business, thousands of E-GOLD users opened their accounts with obviously bogus and false contact information, including accounts opened in the name of “Mickey Mouse,” “Donald Duck,” “Anonymous Man,” “bud weiser,” “No Name,” and others.

22. Unlike other Internet payment systems, E-GOLD did not include any statement in its User Agreement prohibiting the use of “e-gold” for criminal activity.

23. Because of the lack of controls as compared to those present with other payment systems, E-GOLD has been a highly-favored method of payment by operators of investment scams, which generally refers to pyramids, ponzis, HYIPs (i.e., high-yield investment programs) and other “get-rich-quick”schemes. These scams typically promise abnormally high short-term returns on investments, but rather than paying investors any actual returns on real investments, the scams pay investors with new, incoming investment money from other investors in the scam.

Eventually, the operators of the scam either disappear with all the investment money or the scam collapses because investment naturally slows as the scam grows and the operators are unable to continue paying out the promised returns. E-GOLD has been favored in this area particularly because of a user’s ability to operate accounts anonymously, and E-GOLD’s policy of making all transfers of “e-gold” irrevocable and not subject to reversal.

24. Thousands of E-GOLD accounts have been opened using the term “hyip” in either the account-owner’s name or e-mail address, or where “hyip” appears in the “memo” field of the transaction record. E-GOLD employees knew and understood that these accounts were used to fund investment scams, yet took no proactive measures to prevent the use of the EGOLD system for this activity.

25. “e-gold” has been a highly-favored method of payment on websites operating to facilitate credit card and identity fraud – so-called “carding” websites. Carding websites operate as bulletin boards and are dedicated to the promotion and facilitation of a wide variety of criminal activities including, among others, electronic theft of personal identifying information, credit card and debit card fraud, and the production and sale of false identification documents. On these websites, criminals around the world meet virtually and advertise and sell their contraband, including stolen credit card numbers, compromised identities, and false identifications, using “e-gold” as a method of payment.

26. “e-gold” has been a highly-favored method of payment for sellers of child pornography over the Internet. In some instances, “e-gold” has been the only method of payment available on websites offering child pornography for sale.

27. On every transfer of “e-gold” from one E-GOLD account to another, E-GOLD collected a specified transaction (or “spend”) fee. E-GOLD also collected a maintenance or storage fee, which was deducted monthly and was based on average daily value in the account.

COUNT ONE
(Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments)

28. The allegations in paragraphs 14 through 27 are realleged as if fully set forth herein.

THE CONSPIRACY

29. From on or about 1999 through December 2005, in the District of Columbia and
elsewhere, the defendants:
E-GOLD, LTD.,
GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC.,
DOUGLAS L. JACKSON,
BARRY K. DOWNEY, and
REID A. JACKSON
did knowingly combine, conspire, and agree with each other and with other persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury to commit offenses against the United States in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956, to wit:

(a) to knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct a financial transaction affecting interstate and foreign commerce, that is transfers of “e-gold” from one account to another, which involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, that is child exploitation, wire fraud, and access device fraud with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, that is child exploitation, wire fraud, and access device fraud, and that while conducting and attempting to conduct such financial transaction knew that the property involved in the financial transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i);

(b) to knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate commerce and foreign commerce, which transactions involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, that is, child exploitation, wire fraud, and access device fraud, knowing that the transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and that while conducting and attempting to conduct such financial transactions, knew that the property involved in the financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i);

(c) to transport, transmit, and transfer, and attempt to transport, transmit, and transfer a monetary instrument or funds involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, that is, child exploitation, wire fraud, and access device fraud, from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States, knowing that the funds involved in the transportation, transmission, and transfer represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission, and transfer was designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i); and

(d) to knowingly engage and attempt to engage, in monetary transactions by, through or to a financial institution, affecting interstate and foreign commerce, in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, that is the deposit, withdrawal, or transfer of funds, such property having been derived from a specified unlawful activity, that is, child exploitation, wire fraud, and access device fraud, contrary to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957.

GOAL OF THE CONSPIRACY

30. It was the purpose of the conspiracy to engage in financial transactions with those known to be involved in criminal activity in order to build the market share and profitability of E-GOLD and enhance the personal wealth of DOUGLAS JACKSON, BARRY DOWNEY, and REID JACKSON.

MANNER AND MEANS
The manner and means used to accomplish the objectives of the conspiracy included, among others, the following:

31. The E-GOLD operation did not require users to provide their true identity, or any specific identity at all, nor did it require any information, except for an e-mail address, to verify or identify account holders at the time an account was opened. Numerous accounts were opened using obviously false identifying and contact information.

32. With few exceptions, the employees hired to operate the E-GOLD payment system had no experience in conducting financial transactions and no background in financial matters at all. Employees of the E-GOLD operation received no training regarding financial transactions or avoiding criminal transactions, nor were they provided any written materials on these matters.

33. The E-GOLD operation routinely required law enforcement and others requesting information through Grand Jury subpoenas and other process about “e-gold” accounts to send their requests to a law firm in Bermuda, falsely making it appear as if the E-GOLD operation was actually located offshore. In fact, the E-GOLD operation was located entirely in Melbourne, Florida and all account information was located there.

34. Regularly, during the course of conducting the E-GOLD operation, the defendants and their employees recognized that certain accounts were being used for criminal purposes. On numerous occasions, the E-GOLD operation indicated in the account records contained in the “e-gold” computer database the type of criminal activity that the account-holder was engaged in, including, among other things, “child porn,” “Scammer,” and “CC fraud.” The defendants nevertheless allowed transactions in these accounts to continue.

35. The E-GOLD operation regularly received complaints from customers that they had been the victim of a crime and also regularly received notification from customers of specific “e-gold” accounts that were involved in criminal activity. It was not the E-GOLD operation’s practice to either close these accounts or, as is required by law for certain financial institutions, report the activity to law enforcement. In certain cases, the E-GOLD operation sent messages to customers who reported investment scams advising them to “educate” themselves about certain types of investment fraud.

36. On numerous occasions when the E-GOLD operation discovered that its customers were involved in activity that appeared to be unlawful, it would require that customer to submit paperwork establishing that the customer was not an affiliate of the E-GOLD operation, but then allow the customer to continue operating once the paperwork was received rather than closing the account and refusing to engage in conducting further criminal financial transactions.

37. Knowing that “e-gold” was being used for criminal activity, including child exploitation, wire fraud (investment scams), and access device fraud (credit card and identity theft), the E-GOLD operation continued to allow accounts to be opened without verification of user identity, assigned only a single employee with no relevant experience to monitor hundreds of thousands of accounts for criminal activity, and encouraged users whose criminal activity had been discovered to transfer their criminal proceeds among other “e-gold” accounts.

38. When a specific account was determined to be engaged in criminal activity, defendants would regularly place a “value-limit” on that account, a procedure whereby an entry would be made in the E-GOLD database limiting the incoming “e-gold” funds that could be received by that account (sometimes to $5,000, sometimes to $500, and sometimes to $0), but not limiting the ability of the account-holder to spend the funds already in the account. Thus, even in circumstances in which the defendants knew that the account contained the proceeds of crime, the defendants allowed the funds to be exchanged out into national currency or transferred to another account.

39. On some occasions, when an E-GOLD customer was informed that a “valuelimit” had been placed on his or her account, it was also suggested that an alternative to providing further documentation for the existing account would be to open another E-GOLD account. A single person or entity was able to open numerous “e-gold” accounts, without any verification of identity or the source and purpose of the funds in question.

40. In some instances where a “value-limit” had been placed on an account, the EGOLD operation would inform the customer subject to the “value-limit” that s/he was still free to move funds out of the E-GOLD account. In these circumstances, no limit was placed on the customer’s ability to transfer their “e-gold” funds to another account they controlled or to another individual engaged in criminal activity, or to use those funds to purchase further contraband, such as child pornography. Similarly, even if the “e-gold” funds involved were criminal proceeds, the customer was free to exchange the “e-gold” for United States or other national currencies without restriction. The customer was also free to open a new account and transfer the funds to that account.

41. In various instances, the E-GOLD operation, at the request of its customer, transferred funds from an account known to be engaged in criminal activity to another operated by the same individual(s), who was then allowed to continue the same criminal activity.

42. On or about the dates listed below, defendants conducted the following transactions on behalf of their customers within the District of Columbia:

DATE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT TRANSACTION

11/15/2004 $45.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx4061 to “egold” account number xxx1237 for the purchase of child pornography

12/8/2004 $100.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx4061 to “egold” account number xxx1242 for the purchase of child pornography

1/21/2005 $100.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx4061 to “egold” account number xxx1242 for the purchase of child pornography

12/5/2005 $200.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx2902 to “egold” account number xxx9602 for the purchase of stolen credit card information

12/12/2005 $39.95 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx4061 to “egold” account number xxx4220 for the purchase of child pornography

43. On or about the dates listed below, among others, defendants conducted funds transfers on behalf of their customers, knowing that the funds involved were the proceeds of unlawful activity, namely child exploitation, and having placed a “value-limit” on those accounts:

The “LS” Transactions

DATE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT TRANSACTION

1/30/2004 $11,056 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx8135 to “egold” account number xxx3751 for exchange

1/30/2004 $5,944 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0965 to “egold” account number xxx3751 for exchange

2/22/2004 $7,660.40 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx9785 to “egold” account number xxx0493

2/22/2004 $3,169.80 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx3520 to “egold” account number xxx0493

3/9/2004 $1,970.50 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx1960 to “egold” account number xxx3751 for exchange

3/22/2004 $12,869 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx4255 to “egold” account number xxx3751 for exchange

The “MyLola” Transactions

DATE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT TRANSACTION

11/20/2003 $400.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx6988 to “egold” account number xx4486 for exchange

3/13/2004 $1,235.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx7553 to “egold” account number xx9481

6/30/2005 $663.75 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx3897 to “egold” account number xxx7684

The “Kidz Index / Timothy McNabb” Transactions

DATE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT TRANSACTION

9/9/2005 $890 worth of “egold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx6181 to “egold” account number xx0775 for exchange

9/20/2005 $45.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx1046 to “egold” account number xxx4936

9/20/2005 $101.61 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx1046 to “egold” account number xx0775 for exchange

9/20/2005 $40.70 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx5548 to “egold” account number xx0775 for exchange

10/4/2005 $66.24 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx1216 to “egold” account number xxx5236

The “lolitanymphets” Transaction

DATE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT TRANSACTION

9/20/2005 $598.00 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx1022 to “egold” account number xxx0069

44. The E-GOLD operation conducted approximately $474,754 worth of transfers within the above-listed accounts, all of which were engaged in the selling of child pornography.

45. On the following occasions, among others, defendants conducted funds transfers on behalf of their customers, knowing that the funds involved were the proceeds of unlawful activity, namely credit card fraud, and having placed a “value-limit” on those accounts:

DATE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT TRANSACTION

8/9/2004 $50 worth of “egold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xx3647

8/9/2004 $846 worth of “egold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xx6160

8/14/2004 $50 worth of “egold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xx0775

9/15/2004 $3,000 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xx7789

9/22/2004 $3,000 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xx7789

9/24/2004 $276 worth of “egold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xxx9368

9/29/2004 $3,000 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xx7789

10/18/2004 $3,000 worth of “e-gold
Transfer from “e-gold” account number xxx0398 to “egold” account number xx7789

46. The E-GOLD operation transferred approximately $76,688 in “e-gold” funds into and out “e-gold” account number xxx03 which belonged to an individual known to be responsible for credit card fraud via the Internet. The E-GOLD operation transferred another approximately $158,508 into and out of another account belonging to the same individual.

47. On the following occasions, among others, defendants conducted funds transfers on behalf of their customers, knowing that the funds involved were the proceeds of unlawful activity, namely wire (investment) fraud, and having placed a “value-limit” on those accounts:

DATE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT TRANSACTION

8/26/2000 – 6/21/2001
$342,670.17 worth of “e-gold”
Transfers of “e-gold” from account number xx5589 to “e-gold” account number xx0015

9/16/2000 – 1/05/2001
$270,125.50 worth of “e-gold”
Transfers of “e-gold” from account number xx5589 to “e-gold” account number xx5585

5/19/2004- 2/09/2005
$19,953 worth of “e-gold”
Transfers of “e-gold” from account xxx3269 to “e-gold” account number xx7715

6/29/2005 $1,009.40 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer of “e-gold” from account number xx5589 to “egold” account number xx9243 for exchange

9/16/2005 $90,000 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer of “e-gold” from account number xx5405 to “egold” account number xxx2125

9/16/2005 $102,689 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer of “e-gold” from account number xx5405 to “egold” account number xxx2125

11/21/2005 $725,000 worth of “e-gold”
Four transfers of “e-gold” from account number xxx9005 to “e-gold” account number xxx9949

11/29/2005 $300,000 worth of “e-gold”
Transfer of “e-gold” from account number xxx9949 to “e-gold” account number xxx9005

48. The total value of “e-gold” funds that the E-GOLD operation transferred and caused to be transferred into and out of the above-listed accounts was approximately $145,535,374.26.

(Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, §§ 1956 (a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B)(i), 1957, and 1956(h))

COUNT TWO
(Conspiracy to Operate Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business)
THE CONSPIRACY

49. The allegations in paragraphs 7 through 27 and 31 through 48 are realleged as if fully set forth herein.

50. From in or about October 26, 2001 through in or about December 2005, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendants
E-GOLD, LTD.,
GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC.,
DOUGLAS L. JACKSON,
BARRY K. DOWNEY
and
REID A. JACKSON
knowingly and willfully combined, conspired, confederated and agreed with each other and with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, to knowingly conduct, control, manage, supervise, direct and own all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business which affected interstate and foreign commerce in any manner and degree, and which was operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a state where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under state law, and which failed to comply with the money transmitting business regulations under Section 5330 of Title 31, United States Code, and regulations prescribed thereunder, and which involved the transportation and transmission of funds that were known to the defendants to have been derived from a criminal offense and were intended to be used to promote and support unlawful activity.

OBJECT OF THE CONSPIRACY

51. It was a goal of the conspiracy that defendants DOUGLAS JACKSON, BARRY DOWNEY, and REID JACKSON, and their co-conspirators, to provide money transmitting services to the public through the E-GOLD operation thereby establishing the E-GOLD operation as a viable private currency and enhancing their own personal wealth.

MANNER AND MEANS

52. It was a part of the conspiracy that DOUGLAS JACKSON, BARRY DOWNEY, and REID JACKSON, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, doing business as E-GOLD, GSR, and OmniPay (the E-GOLD operation), offered a payment processing service to the public in the form of “e-gold,” a digital currency they created that was purportedly backed by stored physical gold and other precious metals.

53. The E-GOLD operation was operating as a money transmitting business as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1960(b)(2).

54. Defendants DOUGLAS JACKSON, BARRY DOWNEY, and REID JACKSON, solicited and caused to be solicited customers for their money transmittal business from inside and outside the United States by, among other things, advertising their service via the Internet at www.e-gold.com and www.omnipay.com.

55. Internal documents drafted in consultation with DOUGLAS JACKSON described the “e-gold” system as being a competitor of PayPal and Western Union with respect to providing payment services and funds transfers.

56. The E-GOLD operation conducted financial transactions on behalf of its customers using computer systems and databases specifically designed for “e-gold” transactions and operated by the principals and employees of the E-GOLD operation in Melbourne, Florida.

57. In order to conduct transactions in “e-gold,” it was necessary for the customer to open an “e-gold” account via the Internet website located at www.e-gold.com. To obtain “egold,” a customer must exchange some amount of national currency, such as United States dollars, into “e-gold” through a company or individual who offers such exchange services. The E-GOLD operation offered its own exchange service in the name of “OmniPay” via the Internet website located at www.omnipay.com. Third party exchangers are a necessary part of the E-GOLD operation in that they provide access to the “e-gold” system for the majority of “egold” users.

58. To obtain “e-gold” through OmniPay, a customer was required to wire national currency, in an amount greater than $1,000, to a bank account specified by the E-GOLD operation. Thereafter, the customer’s “e-gold” account would be credited for the amount of the wire, minus an exchange fee collected by OmniPay.

59. The E-GOLD operation also allowed other individuals and companies to offer “egold” exchange services, provided some of those exchangers with wholesale rates for “e-gold,” and listed certain exchangers on the www.e-gold.com website in its “e-gold Directory.” These exchangers accepted a variety of different types of payments, including, checks, money orders, and cash deposits.

60. The E-GOLD operation did not require other individuals or entities offering “egold” exchange services to be licensed or registered as a money transmitting business, nor did it concern itself with the policies and practices of those exchangers related to the acceptance of cash or other funds, or the true identification of the exchangers’ customers. None of these exchangers are themselves registered or licensed as money transmitting businesses.

61. The E-GOLD operation charged its customers “spend” fees, which are collected on each transfer of “e-gold” from one account to another, as well as “storage” fees, which are an annual fee based on the value of the “e-gold” account.

62. In every transaction where an “e-gold” exchanger converted national currency to “e-gold,” or “e-gold” back to national currency for the benefit of its own customers, the EGOLD operation earned a “spend” fee.

63. Once a customer had obtained “e-gold,” the customer could transfer that “e-gold” to another individual or entity that had an “e-gold” account, to another account owned by the same customer, or to an exchanger for conversion back into United States dollars or another national currency.

64. The E-GOLD operation also offered a bill payment service, advertising on the OmniPay website: “Pay your bills with e-gold; Pay your mortgage, utilities, credit card, butcher, baker, candlestick maker – in short – all your bills with e-gold.” Through this service, a customer could place an order with OmniPay requesting to cash out his or her “e-gold” via check made payable to any individual or creditor specified by the customer.

65. To provide its digital currency exchange service for the purpose of facilitating “egold” funds transfers, defendants opened and maintained several bank accounts in the name of Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., doing business as OmniPay.

66. Defendants conducted wire transfers both into and out of their GSR bank accounts in amounts generally totaling millions of dollars each month, both within and outside of the United States. Defendants received wire transfers into their accounts from individual customers seeking to exchange their national currency into “e-gold,” and from other individuals and entities who needed to buy “e-gold” to provide their own “e-gold” exchange service.

Defendants transferred money out of their accounts by wire for the purpose of exchanging “egold” back into national currency. Defendants transferred funds between e-gold accounts to fulfill orders by their customers.

67. The E-GOLD operation conducted thousands of transactions per day. For example, on November 25, 2005, the defendants advertised on www.e-gold.com that there were 2,500,942 then-existing e-gold accounts. The website recorded the system activity in the previous 24 hours and showed the following information: 2,932 new accounts, 33,179 users accessing accounts, 38,843 e-metal spends (deposits & withdrawals) and “velocity”(i.e., value circulated by spends over a given time) $6,362,572.88 USD equivalent in gold.

68. Defendants E-GOLD, LTD., GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC., DOUGLAS JACKSON, BARRY DOWNEY, and REID JACKSON, operated the GSR bank accounts and money transmitting business of E-GOLD and OmniPay without a license in the District of Columbia or any other state, or registering with the federal government.

OVERT ACTS

In the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect the objects thereof, at least one of the defendants committed or caused to be committed at least one of the following acts, among others, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere:

69. On or about June 26, 2002, defendants opened account no. xxxxxxxxx7487 at First Union National Bank in the name of “Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. dba OmniPay – Wire account.”

70. On or about March 7, 2002, defendants opened account no. xxxxxxxx7192 at Bank of America in the name of “Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. dba OmniPay.”

71. On or about December 30, 2004, defendants opened account no. xxxxxx4851 at Regions Bank in the name of Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. dba OmniPay.

72. On or about December 7, 2004, defendants opened account no. xxxxxxxxx8359 at SunTrust bank in the name of “Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. dba OmniPay.”

73. Defendants advertised on their website at www.e-gold.com that “e-gold” may be used for: “e-commerce,” “business-to-business payments,” “point of service sales,” “person-toperson payments,” “payroll,” “bill payments,” and “charitable donations.”

74. Defendants advertised on their website at www.omnipay.com that they offer “currency exchange services supporting the e-gold family of currencies,” and that they offer a bill payment service allowing “e-gold” customers to convert their e-gold into a check payed to the recipient of their choice.

75. On or about the dates indicated, the defendants conducted the following transactions, which demonstrate their operation of a money transmission service, that is, United States dollars being converted into “e-gold” by OmniPay, then transferred between “e-gold” accounts, and subsequently exchanged back into national currency:

a. On or about November 15, 2002, defendants transferred and caused to be transferred by wire the sum of $1,500.00 from account no. xxxx5286 at Riggs National Bank to Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.’s OmniPay wire account at First Union Bank for exchange into “e-gold.”

b. On or about November 18, 2002, defendants credited “e-gold” account number xx6355 with $1,432.87 worth of “e-gold.”

c. On or about November 19, 2002, defendants transferred and caused to be transferred $1,420.00 worth of “e-gold” from “e-gold” account number xx6355 to “e-gold” account number xx9605.

d. On or about November 26, 2002, defendants transferred and caused to be transferred by wire the sum of $6,000 from “e-gold” account number xx9605 to “e-gold” account number xx9732, belonging to the London Gold Exchange, for exchange into national currency for the benefit of the owner of “e-gold” account number xx9605.

76. On or about the dates listed in the chart below, in furtherance of the conspiracy to operate as an unlicensed money transmitting business, defendants transferred and caused to be transferred the sums indicated to and from banks located in the District of Columbia:

Date Amount From To

5/14/2002 $1,000.00 Account no. xxxx5286 at Riggs National Bank Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.
Account no. xxxxxxxx7192 at Bank of America

5/28/2002 $1,000.00 Account no. xxxx5286 at Riggs National Bank
Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.
Account no. xxxxxxxx7192 at Bank of America

6/27/2002 $1,000.00 Account no. xxxx5286 at Riggs National Bank
Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.
Account no. xxxxxxxx7487 at First Union National Bank

10/24/2002 $70.00 Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.
Account no. xxxxxxxxx7487 at First Union National Bank
Account no. xxxxx4345 at Wright Patman Congressional Federal Credit Union

11/15/2002 $1,500.00 Account no. xxxx5286 at Riggs National Bank Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.
Account no. xxxxxxxxx7487 at First Union National Bank

11/20/2002 $195.00 Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.
Account no. xxxxxxxxx7487 at Wachovia Bank
Account no. xxxxx4345 at Wright Patman Congressional Federal Credit Union

3/24/2003 $1,500.00 Account no. xxxx5286 at Riggs National Bank
Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.
Account no. xxxxxxxxx7487 at Wachovia Bank

(Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States, in violation of 18 United States Code, Section 371)

COUNT THREE
(Operation of an Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business)
Beginning on or about October 26, 2001, through at least until December of 2005, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendants,
E-GOLD, LTD.,
GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC.,
DOUGLAS L. JACKSON,
BARRY K. DOWNEY,
and
REID A. JACKSON
did knowingly conduct, control, manage, supervise, direct, and own all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1960(b)(1), through the operation of E-GOLD and GSR d/b/a OmniPay, in that the business: (i) affected interstate and foreign commerce; (ii) was operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in the District of Columbia, where such operation was punishable as a felony under the law of the District of Columbia; (iii) failed to comply with the money Transmitting business registration requirements under Section 5330 of Title 31, United States Code, and regulations prescribed thereunder, and; (iv) otherwise involved the transportation and transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense and are intended to be used to promote and support unlawful activity.
(Prohibition of Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1960 and 2)

COUNT FOUR
(Money Transmission without a License)

Beginning on or about May 14, 2002, through at least March 25, 2003, in the District of Columbia, the defendants DOUGLAS JACKSON, BARRY DOWNEY, and REID JACKSON did, without obtaining a license issued by the Superintendent of the Office of Banking and Financial Institutions of the District of Columbia, engage in the business of money transmission, as that term is defined in D.C. ST. § 26-1001(10), through the operation of EGOLD and GSR d/b/a OmniPay, in that they engaged in the business of receiving money for transmission, and transmitting money, within the United States and to locations abroad.
(Money Transmissions, in violation of § 26-1002 of the D.C. Code)

NOTICE OF FORFEITURE

77. The violations alleged in Count One and Three of this indictment are realleged and incorporated by reference herein for the purpose of alleging forfeiture to the United States of America pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1).

78. As a result of the offenses alleged in Counts One and Three of this indictment, the defendants E-GOLD, LTD., GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC., DOUGLAS JACKSON, REID JACKSON, and BARRY DOWNEY shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in, or traceable to such property involved in money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956, and in operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1960; including, but not limited to the following:

(a) The sum of money equal to the total amount of property involved in, or traceable to property involved in those violations. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1).

(b) All the assets, including without limitation, equipment, inventory, accounts receivable and bank accounts, of E-GOLD, LTD., and GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC., whether titled in those names or not, including, but not limited to all precious metals, including gold, silver, platinum, and palladium, that “back” the emetal electronic currency of the E-GOLD operation, wherever located.

If more than one defendant is convicted of an offense, the defendants so convicted are jointly and severally liable for the amount derived from such offense. By virtue of the commission of the felony offenses charged in Counts One and Three of this indictment, any and all interest that the defendant has in the property involved in, or traceable to property involved in money laundering is vested in the United States and hereby forfeited to the United States pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section 982(a)(1).

79. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b)(1), each defendant shall forfeit substitute property, up to the value of the amount described above, if, by any act or omission of said defendant, the property identified above as subject to forfeiture

(a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(b) has been transferred, sold to or deposited with a third party;

(c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

(d) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty.

All in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1) and Rule 32.2(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(Criminal Forfeiture pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(a)(1); Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b)(1), and Rule 32.2a, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure)

A TRUE BILL
FOREPERSON
ATTORNEY FOR THE UNITED STATES IN
AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Case 1:07-cr-00109-RMC Document 1 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 28 of 28

Posted today on a email list, it was a reply to a sarcastic comment made (first few lines below) from another poster – a good reply:

Raven, remember the US is less bad its not like they torture, start preemptive wars, or seize private property without due process.
Hate-America is a baseless mania. No?

Where do you get your information?

Haven’t you heard of legalized torture? It was passed within the last year in the US, in response to accusations against the US military. See http://www.google.com/search?q=legalized+torture

You’ve never heard of the US starting preemptive wars? The Bush Doctrine specifically calls for preemptive military force, and the US has used preemptive force at least as far back as the 1820’s under John Quincy Adams. They regularly stick their noses into situations that don’t involve defense of the US.

There are numerous cases of private property being seized and handed over to other private parties. For example, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4715674. I’d say this almost by definition is without due process.

There are numerous other examples. The IRS can seize your assets without even a hearing. The state of Virginia can create a tax judgment against you AS THOUGH there had been a court case, even when there wasn’t.

“Hate-America” might be a mania, but it is certainly not baseless.